Business and Military Friction - The Model 1916 Field Gun

During the First World War, U.S. Army Major General William J. Snow was appointed Chief of the Field Artillery in February of 1918. He would be the first in the newly created position, though unofficial at the time, that still exists at Fort Sill, OK. In addition to ensuring that American Artillerymen are trained, equipped, and prepared for mobilization to Europe, he was naturally a lead stakeholder in the acquisition process for new artillery weaponry. What he would quickly discover, however, was something known to many in the industry at the time, that American manufacturing and the Army’s Ordnance Department did not have a working relationship that could promptly facilitate shifts to wartime development and production. One element of this disconnect between American business manufacturing and military procurement, was the production of carriages and the development of a recoil mechanism for a new American-made field gun, the Model 1916.

Leading up to America’s entry into the Great War, it was apparent that European militaries were coming to bear against each other with weapons and other technologies that outclassed what the American army had. As a result, early on, it was apparent that the US Army needed a modernization effort to catch up to what was becoming a military reality - industrialized warfare. One painfully obvious element of the war was the heavy reliance on artillery weapon systems, and the United States’ artillerymen and their guns were also painfully aware that they could not compete. One anonymous artilleryman, writing for Scientific American in 1916, stated:

It is very evident to any one who has followed the development of artillery in the European war, that in this branch or the service, so far as our equipment is concerned, we are sadly deficient… The fault is due, primarily, to the parsimony of Congress in refusing to grant the increase in personnel necessary to enable the Ordnance Department to do the experimental work, draft out the plans, and build some of the heavier types of guns. (Unknown 1916, 121)

While we were indeed deficient in both heavy and lighter calibers of guns, they were working on a lighter model using the new recoil mechanism designed by the Europeans. The solution to this issue was the ongoing work on the American-made “Model 1916” 75mm field gun. Its design was informed heavily by the conduct of the European conflict. That being said, however, constant changes to doctrine and technology in Europe compelled the United States Ordnance Department and its contractors to constantly take the design of the Model 1916 back to the drawing board.

The "Model 1916" would finish its design and enter production by the end of the war in 1918, and would have to wait to see combat in World War II, but in limited number.

In regard to the carriage of the gun, Snow was not unfamiliar with its proposed design and capabilities, as he was familiar with the evolution of artillery development in 1913 before he left for foreign service between 1914 and 1917. By the time of his arrival in February 1918, bearing witness to all that had been done, he realized numerous contracts awarded to manufacturers to produce the carriage for the gun had gone unfulfilled, and this was partly the result of manufacturing problems and constant changes to the design.

This unjustifiable and childlike faith in the Model 1916 gun, even as late as December, 1917, when the Willys-Overland Company was awarded the large contract for 2,927 at the cost of about $21,000,000, was all the more remarkable when it is realized that not one had yet been delivered on the contracts made in 1916 - this for the reason that the contractors had been unable to make the carriage. This fact was well known to the Ordnance Department, which was continually making changes in the drawings and specifications to correct defects that developed in the course of manufacture. (Snow 1941, 218)

The recoil mechanism, called a recuperator, was also a major issue plaguing the production of the Model 1916. Even if the carriages could be produced on schedule and in sufficient number, they are functionally useless without the recuperator. The reason is that not only does the recuperator absorb the cannon's recoil when it fires (reducing the need to move it back into position and re-aim), but the cannon cannot literally be attached to the carriage without it. Relatively speaking, the carriage was more straightforward to design and manufacture than a recuperator, as the recoil mechanism was a machine-tooled part needing precision instruments. The biggest issue was that the Ordnance Department did not have an agreed-upon design (two types were being considered) or a sufficient number of machine tools to produce them. Even if they did select one, the real question was whether they could them get them fielded fast enough. Snow’s sentiment was apt:

But suppose we drop the spring recuperator, and consider the [hydraulic recuperator]. Only one of these had been made; it was untested; it was still in France, IF it were promptly tested in France and IF it successfully tested out, and IF it were then promptly sent to the United States, and IF the drawings for the recuperator were also sent to this country promptly, and IF the drawing for the jigs, tools, and fixtures also came promptly, why, then, as soon as the machine tools could be collected, manufacture could begin! (219)

And remember, for Major General Snow, his primary purpose was the preparation of artillerymen for combat in Europe, and they had no modern guns to train. Indeed, they could acquire a handful of French 75mm field guns, but those were still needed on the frontlines. The failures of the business and military industry and design had created a significant and deadly problem for the end user. This American artilleryman had to make do with obsolete equipment and hoped that they could train up later in Europe. Snow, as the facilitator of Artillery training for the United States Army, held this sentiment:

Here it was early in 1918 and we were still experimenting on a gun and carriage with which to fight the war. And the war was going on all the time while we were trying to design a gun and carriage with which to fight; we were even calling on a foreign country to help us in our designing. It is a great temptation to make some caustic remarks on such a procedure. And the temptation is especially great when it is realized that there were 42 brigades of field artillery (comprising almost a quarter of a million men) actually in existence and waiting for guns with which to train. (Snow 1941, 220)

American artillerymen in France often manned French guns, such as this Canon de 75 modèle 1915 Saint-Chamond. The St. Chamond was the basis for the Model 1916 with its eventual hydraulic recuperator that could absorb the recoil of the gun with little movement of the carriage - as shown in this animation.

By the time the Model 1916 was completed and entered service as the M1916, the war was entering its end phase, and only a handful of the few hundred that were produced made it into France; none saw combat. Afterwards, while a few thousand had entered service, the field gun concept was already made obsolete by the development of indirect fire techniques and improvements in howitzer employment. The M1916 would only see sporadic combat during World War II, by those nations that had acquired them for cheap or had been given them by the United States.

While the fighting spirit of the American Soldier and Marine in Europe was without question, there were concerns about how such an industrially powerful nation, like the United States, couldn’t shift to wartime production. However, while there were problems, true failure only occurs when one fails to learn from their mistakes, and America did learn from its procurement issues. World War I saw the beginnings of the War Industries Board, and the relationship between the Ordnance Department and contractors, and during the Interwar years, they worked to improve processes and procedures for contracting, development, and acquisition in time for World War II where the United States truly could show its industrial might in war.

With these lessons fresh in mind Congress took steps to provide for a similar emergency in the future. On 4 June 1920, the National Defense Act of 1920 was approved, and industrial preparedness was made the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of War. Under the terms of the new act, the Assistant Secretary was made responsible not only for War Department procurement to meet its own needs in peace and war, but for peacetime industrial mobilization planning for the entire nation. (Smith 1991, 39)

There is little doubt that the success of World War II wartime production and procurement was established in the aftermath of World War I acquisition problems.

Sources/References:

Baruch, Bernard M. American Industry in the War : A Report of the War Industries Board. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921.

Bruce, Kyle, and Adam Smith. “Scientific Management and the American Planning Experience of WWI: The Case of the War Industries Board.” History of Economics Review / 23, no. 1 (1995): 37–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/10370196.1995.11733185.

Bruce, Kyle. "ARTICLES - Scientific Management, Institutionalism, and Business Stabilization: 1903-1923." Journal of Economic Issues: Jei 35, no. 4 (2001).

Unknown. “The Field Artillery of the United States Army.” Scientific American 115, no. 6 (1916): 120–42. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26014873.

Snow, William J. “Rise and Fall of the American 75” The Field Artillery Journal 31 (April 1941) 218-223

Snow, William J. Signposts of Experience. United States Field Artillery Association. 1941

Smith, R. Elberton. The Army and Economic Mobilization. Washington: Center of Military History, 1991.